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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee agrees with Appellant's Statement Of Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether Plaintiff waived and abandoned claims of breach 
of warranty and product liability by failing to brief or argue 
any basis for error in his Brief On Appeal, thereby conceding 
summary judgment was properly granted by the trial court. 
Whether a party has abandoned a claim on appeal is a 
question of law for the reviewing court. See Paxton v. State 
Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 809 P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in granting summary 
judgment in a slip and fall case where the Plaintiff failed to 
forward any admissible evidence that Defendant knew or should 
have known of the existence of the dangerous condition by failing 
to forward evidence regarding when the condition arose or how 
long it existed prior to the accident. 
A trial court's decision to grant summary judgment is 
reviewed de novo by the appellate court. Wineaar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative statues and rules are set forth as 
necessary in the text of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant accepts, for purposes of this appeal, the 
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Plaintiff's Statement Of The Case. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In the trial court the following facts were undisputed, and 
"admitted for purposes of summary judgment" pursuant to Rule 4-
501(2)(a) of the Code of Judicial Administration having been 
offered by the Defendant and unopposed by the Plaintiff, with the 
exceptions noted below. See, R. 99-116; R. 117-133. 
1. Defendant Waste Management of Utah, Inc. is in part, 
[in] the business of leasing office trailers to construction 
companies, which trailers are used on-site for offices and other 
needs of construction companies. See, R. 61. 
2. On July 6, 1990, TIC [Plaintiff's employer] leased from 
Modulaire (a related company of Defendant) a double-wide mobile 
field office, (citation omitted) See, R. 115. 
3. Defendant did not manufacture the subject trailer. 
Instead it was manufactured by an unrelated company by the name 
of Advanced Modular which is located in Bluffdale, Utah. 
Advanced Modular is not a party to this lawsuit. (See deposition 
of Jerry Bryant, p. 7). 
4. The terms and conditions outlined in the lease 
agreement between Defendant and TIC required TIC to perform the 
general maintenance associated with the trailer and to pay for 
that maintenance. (Bryant deposition, p. 10)(Exhibit A, 
paragraph 12, Terms and Conditions). Paragraph 12 of the Terms 
and Conditions of the lease states as follows: 
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1212. Maintenance, damage, and destruction - except as 
specifically otherwise provided in this paragraph, 
LESSEE [TIC] SHALL AT LESSEE'S OWN EXPENSE AT ALL TIMES 
KEEP THE EQUIPMENT IN GOOD AND EFFICIENT WORKING ORDER, 
CONDITION AND REPAIR AND SHALL KEEP AND MAINTAIN 
THEREON SUCH IDENTIFICATION OF OWNERSHIP AS LESSOR MAY 
REQUIRE. Lessor will maintain and make any repairs 
required from normal use to the roof, doors, windows, 
light fixtures, heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning systems, except that LESSEE SHALL REPLACE 
HEATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR CONDITIONING FILTERS AND 
BURNED OUT LAMPS AS REQUIRED AND PAY FOR ANY DAMAGE 
CAUSED BY LESSEE. LESSEE SHALL BEAR THE FULL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING THE EQUIPMENT AGAINST THE 
RISK OF DAMAGE, THEFT, OR DESTRUCTION OF THE LEASED 
EQUIPMENT FROM EVERY CAUSE, AND SHALL MAKE ALL 
REPLACEMENTS, REPAIRS, OR SUBSTITUTION OF PARTS OF 
EQUIPMENT THEREON AT ITS EXPENSE, ALL OF WHICH SHALL 
CONSTITUTE AN ACCESSION TO THE LEASED EQUIPMENT. IF 
LESSEE DOES NOT ADEQUATELY REPAIR ANY DAMAGE FOR WHICH 
LESSEE IS RESPONSIBLE, LESSOR SHALL HAVE THE OPTION TO 
PERFORM THE MAINTENANCE OR REPAIR AT LESSEE'S EXPENSE. 
ANY DAMAGE CAUSED BY NEGLIGENCE OF LESSOR WILL BE 
REPAIRED AT THE EXPENSE OF LESSOR. LESSEE SHALL AT ITS 
EXPENSE PROVIDE ADEQUATE JANITORIAL SERVICES TO KEEP 
THE LEASE EQUIPMENT IN GOOD CONDITION, FAIR WEAR AND 
TEAR ACCEPTED. 
(See Exhibit A, paragraph 12) See, R. 115. 
5. Before the trailer was taken to the site where TIC used 
it, it was inspected. (Bryan deposition, p. 11). 
6. Once the trailer arrived on site it was again inspected 
with a check list. (Bryant deposition, p. 11)(See inspection 
list, attached as Exhibit B, and incorporated herein by reference 
as if set forth in full). See. R. 116. 
7. Part of the inspection includes a review of the 
structural requirements and integrity of the trailer. (Bryant 
deposition, p. 12). 
8. This inspection did not reveal any defects relevant to 
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the floor or the area where Plaintiff's alleged accident took 
place. (Bryant deposition, p. 121). 
9. Upon receipt of the trailer, TIC proceeded to install 
walls to create individual office space. (Danny R. Piva 
deposition, p. 13). 
10. In September of 1991, Waste Management, at the request 
of TIC, replaced some floor tiles near one of the doors to the 
trailer because the tiles were coming loose. (Danny R. Piva 
deposition, p. 24; Linnae Jolley deposition, p. 9; Richard Young 
deposition, pp. 38- 41). 
11. The entire time TIC had the trailer up until the time 
of Plaintiff's alleged accident, none of the individuals who 
worked in the trailer experienced any giveaway or weakness in the 
floor or any other problems other than those related to the 
tiling situation mentioned above. (Janae Young deposition, p. 
10; Danny Piva, pp. 29-30; Sheryl Piva deposition, p. 20; Linnae 
Jolly, p. 19; Plaintiff's deposition, p. 36). 
12. Defendant did not receive any notice of a dangerous 
condition with respect to the floor. (Bryant deposition, pp. 14-
15) . 
13. In fact, the trailer was returned the day after the 
alleged incident and there was no visible damage to the unit. 
(Bryant deposition, p. 14). 
14. The area wherein Plaintiff's alleged accident took 
place is not the same area where the minor tile repair work 
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occurred. (Piva deposition, p. 29; Young deposition, pp. 38-41). 
15. During the pendency of the lease, Plaintiff's employer, 
TIC, was in sole and exclusive possession and control of the 
trailer in question apart from the minor repairs they hired 
Defendant to perform. 
16. Just prior to Plaintiff's accident, TIC demobilized the 
unit to prepare it for return to Defendant. (Young deposition, 
p. 10). 
17. This demobilization included removing the walls TIC had 
installed to create office space. (Young deposition, pp. 11, 12; 
Janae Young deposition, p. 10; Piva deposition, pp. 18-19; Linnae 
Jolley, p. 10, Sheryl Piva, p. 11, Plaintiff's deposition, pp. 
31-33) . 
18. During this tear out process, no one at any time up 
until the occurrence of Plaintiff's alleged accident noticed any 
problems with the floor whatsoever. (Plaintiff's deposition, pp. 
21, 22, 31-32, 39; Sheryl Piva deposition, p. 20, Jolly 
deposition p. 19, Janae Young deposition, p. 10, Danny Piva 
deposition pp. 29-30; Richard Young deposition, pp. 14-15). 
19. In fact, the Plaintiff frequented the trailer during 
his employment with TIC and had been in and out of the trailer 
many times, averaging at least once a day and had not noticed any 
problems with the floor. (Plaintiff's deposition pp. 21-22. 
20. In fact, Plaintiff assisted in the demobilization and 
had been in and out of the trailer multiple times on the date of 
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the accident, in the days prior to the date of the accident, and 
during the demobilization. (Young deposition, p. 10, Plaintiff's 
deposition, p. 33). 
In his Opposition To Defendant's Motion, pursuant to Rule 
4-501(2)(b) Plaintiff disputed only paragraphs 12 and 13 of 
Defendant's Statement Of Facts, stating at R. 118-119: 
* * * 
3. Defendant asserts in paragraph 12 of its Statement of 
Points and Authorities in support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment that Defendant did not receive any notice of any 
problems with respect to the floor in the area where Plaintiff's 
accident took place. The material fact is in dispute. In 
approximately March, 1992, TIC called Modulaire several times 
concerning needed repairs to the floor in the front door area of 
the trailer. (See deposition of Danny Ray Piva, p. 24-25) an 
unknown person performed structural work in this area which 
included new structural support members, new subfloor material 
and new tile.(See deposition of Danny Ray Piva, p. 24-25; 
deposition of Richard Young, p. 38-40). 
• * * 
5» Defendant also asserts in paragraph 13 of its Statement 
of Points and Authorities in support of its Motion For Summary 
Judgment that the trailer was returned to the lessor the day 
after the incident and there was no damage to the unit. Yet, 
witnesses present at the time of the incident testified under 
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oath during the taking of depositions that Plaintiff's leg fell 
through the floor of the trailer and that there was a hole left 
in the floor. (See deposition of Plaintiff, p. 39-41; Deposition 
of Richard Young, p. 220-26.) 
By operation of Rule 4-501(2)(b), of the Code Of Judicial 
Administration the facts not specifically disputed above were 
deemed admitted for purposes of Defendant's motion and were the 
undisputed facts upon which the Trial Court based its ruling 
granting Defendant summary judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff failed to argue or brief his claims of breach of 
warranty or product liability. As a result such claims are 
waived and abandoned on appeal. 
In the trial court, Plaintiff failed to forward admissible, 
material evidence to support a prima facie case of negligence 
against Defendant. Specifically, Plaintiff failed to forward any 
disputed evidence tending to show that the allegedly dangerous 
condition causing his fall was actually known or should have been 
known to Defendant. 
Significantly, in the trial court Plaintiff failed to 
forward any admissible evidence that the alleged dangerous 
condition existed or could have been discovered when prior 
repairs were undertaken. It would be improper to allow a jury to 
speculate that Defendant should have discovered the dangerous 
condition simply because prior work was done on the floor of the 
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trailer. There is simply no competent evidence that the alleged 
dangerous condition existed and/or could have been discovered at 
any time prior to Plaintiff's fall. Moreover, no evidence was 
presented showing that the condition existed for such a period of 
time that Defendant, in the regular course of its reasonable 
duties, could have corrected it. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE BREACH OF WARRANTY 
AND PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS CONSTITUTES WAIVER OF THE 
CLAIMS OF ERROR ON APPEAL. 
Utah C o u r t s r e c o g n i z e t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t , "where an 
a p p e l l a n t f a i l s t o b r i e f an i s s u e on a p p e a l , t h e p o i n t i s 
w a i v e d . " P a x t o n v . S t a t e Farm Mutual I n s u r a n c e C o . , 809 P . 2 d 
7 4 6 , 751 (Utah App. 1 9 9 1 ) . S i m i l a r l y , i s s u e s r a i s e d i n a 
d o c k e t i n g s t a t e m e n t b u t n o t b r i e f e d t h e r e a f t e r a r e deemed w a i v e d 
and a b a n d o n e d . R o s e l l i v . R i o Communit ies S e r v i c e S t a t i o n , 787 
P . 2 d 428 (N.M. 1 9 8 0 ) ; In Re: P u l v e r , 871 P . 2 d 985 (N.M. App. 
1994 J . 1 Case a u t h o r i t y a l s o h o l d s a p a r t y may n o t a r g u e m a t t e r s 
f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n i t s r e p l y b r i e f i n an a t t e m p t t o p l a c e t h e 
1
 See a l s o . Union Oi l Co. of C a l i f , v . S t a t e , 677 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Alaska 
1984) ( p o i n t s i n i t i a l l y r a i s e d for appeal but not b r i e f e d are cons idered 
abandoned); Qua l i ty Furni ture I n c . v . Hay, 61 Haw. 89, 595 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1979) 
( i s s u e s r a i s e d but not argued i n b r i e f are waived) ; Northwest Nat iona l Gas Co. 
v . G e o r g i a - P a c i f i c Corp. , 53 Or. App. 89, 630 P.2d 1326, 1329 ( a s s i g n e d e r r o r s 
not b r i e f e d are deemed waived) review den ied , 291 Or. 893, 642 P.2d 309 (1981) ; 
Kurpiuweit v . Northwestern Dev. Co. I n c . , 708 P.2d 39, 46 (Wyo. 1985) ( errors not 
a s s e r t e d are waived or abandoned); Board of Education v . Kansas Dept. of Human 
Resources , 856 P.2d 1343 (Kan. App. 1993); Emery v . Federated Foods, I n c . , 863 
P.2d 426 (Mont. 1993 ) . 
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waived issue back before the court. Braun v. Alaska Commercial 
Fishing and Agricultural Bank, 816 P.2d 140 (Alaska 1991). 
In this matter Plaintiff originally brought three causes of 
action against Defendant based on negligence, breach of the 
warranty of habitability and product liability. See, R. 2-5. In 
his brief on appeal, Plaintiff addresses only the trial court's 
final judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim. Accordingly, 
Plaintiff has abandoned his claims of breach of warranty and 
product liability. Summary Judgment may be affirmed as to those 
two claims as a matter of law. 
II. 
WASTE MANAGEMENT IS NOT LIABLE IN NEGLIGENCE FOR 
DANGEROUS CONDITIONS IN THE LEASED PROPERTY OF WHICH IT 
HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR REASONABLE TIME TO CURE 
Plaintiff's first cause of action as alleged in his Amended 
Complaint is based on negligence. The over-arching proposition 
of lessor/lessee liability is that a landlord is not the insurer 
of the safety of its tenants. Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 
727 (Utah 1985) . 
Utah law recognizes that a lessor of premises cannot be held 
liable for defects to the property unless the lessor knew or had 
reason to know of the dangerous condition and had sufficient time 
to remedy the condition after actual or constructive knowledge 
exists. Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, Ltd.. 754 P.2d 89 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Williams v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1985); Stephenson v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567 (Utah 1978); See also, 
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Moore v. Muntzel, 642 P.2d 957 (Kan. 1982). 
A lessor's duty is defined as follows: 
. . . a landlord is bound by the usual standard of 
exercising ordinary prudence and care to see that the 
premises he leases are reasonably safe and suitable for 
intended uses, [and] under appropriate circumstances he 
may be liable for injuries caused by any defects or 
dangerous conditions which he created/ or of which he 
was aware, and which he should reasonably foresee would 
expose others to an unreasonable risk of harm. 
Stephenson. at 568 (citing Moore, at 958). 
At the foundation of a lessor's duty to prevent injury 
caused by a dangerous condition on premises is the lessor's 
knowledge of the condition.2 However, knowledge is not 
established by simply forwarding evidence that a person fell and 
that the fall was caused by a dangerous condition in the 
premises. The threshold question to be resolved by a jury in all 
such cases is; "when did the condition arise?" The issue of 
knowledge and any resulting duty is entirely dependent on the 
answer to this initial inquiry. 
Only when there is some material evidence regarding when the 
condition arose can it be properly determined whether the 
defendant actually knew or should have known a particular 
condition existed. After all, it would be sheer speculation to 
state that an inspection of the premises would have provided 
knowledge of a dangerous condition if there is no evidence that, 
2
 The knowledge of a dangerous condition triggers the Defendant's duty. 
If there is no notice, either actual or constructive, no duty is triggered as a 
matter of law. See Stephenson, at 568. 
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in fact, the condition could have been discovered by an earlier 
inspection. Similarly, Plaintiff cannot establish that the 
condition existed for such a period of time that it should have 
been discovered and remedied by the Defendant if there is not 
some evidence to suggest when the condition first arose. 
A. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO OFFER ANY EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE. 
Plaintiff asserted in the trial court and has reasserted on 
appeal that Defendant had actual knowledge of a dangerous 
condition existing in the floor at the time Plaintiff fell. In 
support of that claim Plaintiff argues: 
By calling and requesting that Modulaire come and repair the 
water damage to the floor of the trailer, TIC placed 
Defendant on notice that a dangerous condition existed with 
the floor area in front of the door. TIC responded to the 
call and made some repairs. A factual question still exists 
as to the nature and extent of these repairs. 
Appellant's Brief p. 13; See, also, R. 122. 
Plaintiff's appeal is based exclusively on the premise that 
Defendant had actual knowledge of a defect in the floor prior to 
Plaintiff's fall. Plaintiff argues that when repairs were made 
to the floor of the trailer in September of 1991, the Defendants 
must have had notice of the existence of the dangerous condition 
which caused Plaintiff's fall over six months later on April 28, 
1992. See Brief of Appellant, p. 11, 13, 15. Plaintiff argues 
that such knowledge can be inferred by a jury as a matter of 
"logic." Id. 
The fatal flaw in Plaintiff's argument is the lack of any 
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evidentiary connection between the evidence offered regarding the 
nature of the previous repairs to the floor and evidence of the 
condition of the floor at the time Plaintiff fell. To properly 
show some evidence that Defendant had actual knowledge that a 
dangerous condition existed at the time prior repairs were made, 
Plaintiff should have forwarded some admissible evidence tending 
to show that the condition of the floor at the time of the 
earlier repairs would have alerted a reasonable person that the 
condition was presently dangerous or could become so during the 
ensuing weeks or months. Plaintiff offered no evidence that the 
dangerous condition existed or was observable when the prior 
repairs were made. 
In fact, in the trial court, Plaintiff did not dispute the 
statement of undisputed facts forwarded by Defendant which 
demonstrated that Plaintiff did not even fall in the area where 
repairs were previously made.3 See, supra. State Of Relevant 
Facts No. 14. Instead, for the first time on appeal, Plaintiff 
argues that the jury should be able to "logically" conclude that 
simply because some repairs were previously made to the floor, 
that must have been where Plaintiff fell and, as a result, the 
dangerous condition must have existed earlier and been known to 
Defendant. 
3
 Plaintiff is bound by the undisputed fact that the his fall did not 
even occur in the area where prior repairs were made. Because the statement of 
fact was undisputed in the court below, the admission is binding for purposes of 
summary judgment and on appeal, see 4-501(2)(b). 
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Contrary to Plaintiff's novel argument, the trial court 
properly precluded the jury from speculating that the condition 
that caused Plaintiff's fall "must have" existed or "had to be 
known" to defendant merely because repairs were made earlier. 
Moreover, the disputed evidence of the location of Plaintiff's 
fall, even if properly raised below, does not itself, support the 
necessary inference that Defendant must have had notice of the 
dangerous condition when prior repairs were made. In the case of 
Kitchen v. Cal Gas, 821 P.2d 458 (Utah App. 1991), the court 
ruled that evidence that a truck driver was driving improperly 
forty-five minutes before an accident occurred was not admissible 
as tending to establish that he was driving negligently at the 
time of the accident. The court ruled that the jury could not be 
left to make such a speculative leap in logic. Id. 
By analogy, in the present case, evidence that Defendant was 
called to perform some repairs to the floor six months earlier is 
not competent, admissible evidence tending to show that a 
defective condition existed at the time of Plaintiff's fall or, 
more significantly, that the condition was known to Defendant at 
any time. After all, as recognized in Kitchen, there are 
"numerous possible explanations" as to the floor's dangerous 
condition, "many of which would not involve the negligence" of 
Defendant. See Kitchen, at 459. In fact, all of the relevant 
witness in this matter testified that they had observed no prior 
problems with the floor of the trailer prior to Plaintiff's fall. 
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See, supra. Statement Of Relevant Facts No. 18. Here, as in 
Kitchen, "submitting the issue of negligence to the jury would 
require the jury to engage in mere speculation as to whether (the 
Defendant) was negligent." Jd. at 460. 
In sum, Plaintiff failed to present any competent, 
admissible evidence to connect the fact of prior repairs to the 
floor with knowledge of the condition of the floor at the time 
Plaintiff fell. To permit the jury to speculate that actual 
knowledge existed based only on the fact that earlier repairs 
occurred would have been improper under the law as stated by this 
Court in Kitchen. Plaintiff failed to forward admissible 
evidence of negligence and, as a result there is no evidence to 
establish that a duty toward Plaintiff ever arose in this case. 
Summary judgment was properly entered and may be affirmed on 
appeal• 
B. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUBMIT ANY GENUINE EVIDENCE OF 
CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION. 
Plaintiff's failure to forward some admissible evidence 
regarding when the condition arose is also fatal to any claim of 
constructive notice. Constructive notice is imposed on a 
landlord when a dangerous condition exists and could have been 
discovered by the landlord during its reasonable inspection of 
the premises. Gregory, 754 P.2d at 91. It is also recognized 
that the constructive notice of latent conditions cannot exist 
where the lessee is in exclusive control of the premises. See 
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Moore v. Munsell, 642 P.2d 957, 958 (Kan. 1982). Where the 
landlord gives up all possessory interest and maintenance of the 
premises is undertaken by the lessee, the landlord has no 
realistic opportunity to inspect or repair and a duty to discover 
cannot be imposed because it is realistically incapable of 
performance. See, Id; See also Beach v. University Of Utah, 726 
P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1986) . 
More importantly, however, is Plaintiff's failure to forward 
any competent evidence regarding when the condition arose. 
Absent some evidence of when the defect arose, it cannot be said 
that the Defendant should have discovered it at some earlier 
point it in its duty to inspect and/or maintain the trailer. 
Without some evidentiary benchmark of time, it is improper to 
allow a jury to speculate whether the condition could or should 
have been discovered before the accident. Therefore, Plaintiff 
failed to establish that a duty arose as a matter of law. 
Finally, no evidence was presented to the trial court upon 
which a jury could base a finding regarding the length of time 
the defective condition existed. Absent some evidence of how 
long the condition existed, or its cause, it is sheer conjecture 
to surmise that Defendant had a reasonable period of time to 
remedy the situation before the accident. See Gregory, at 91. 
Plaintiff's negligence claim fails for the simple reason 
that no admissible evidence was presented regarding when the 
alleged dangerous condition developed, for how long it existed or 
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that Defendant was or should have become aware of its existence 
prior to the accident. Summary judgment should be affirmed in 
favor of Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff failed to address the warranty or product 
liability claims in his brief. As a result claims of error as to 
those causes of action are waived on appeal. 
It has been shown that Plaintiff failed to forward any 
admissible evidence regarding when the alleged dangerous 
condition arose. His failure to forward such evidence is fatal 
to his claims of actual or constructive knowledge by Defendant. 
Therefore, no duty arose on the part of Defendant. Plaintiff's 
negligence claim fails as a matter of law. Summary judgment, as 
granted by the trial court, may be affirmed here on appeal. 
DATED, November 4, 1996. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
SCOTTW.TCHRISTENSBN 
BRADLEY fR. HELSTEN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Waste Management Of Utah, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ \ ^ day of October, 1996, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served via 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mr. James W. McConkie, Esq. 
PARKER, MCKEOWN & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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SCOTT W. CHRISTENSEN, UBN 0649 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
4 Triad Center, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 




WASTE MANAGEMENT OF UTAH, INC. 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 940904775 PI 
Judge David S. Young 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, having come 
before the court on Friday, May 3, 1996, plaintiff being 
represented by James R. McConkie, defendant being represented by 
Scott W. Christensen, the court having reviewed the pleadings, 
having heard oral argument, and being fully advised in the 
premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiff 
presented no evidence upon which a jury could conclude that the 
plaintiff received his injuries in the area where repairs had been 
performed some months prior to his accident. Without other 
evidence of what the defect consisted of, when it arose, or when it 
0 0 0 1 G 5 
would reasonably have been discovered, summary judgment for the 
defendant was proper. 
DATED this Ib day of May, 1996. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT: 
JAMES W. McCONKIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
94-523D 
ERHART\ORDER 
2 
